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CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS IN PRIVATE 
LITIGATION: BALANCING INTERESTS IN 
ANONYMITY AND DISCLOSURE 
Ethan D. Wohl∗
ABSTRACT 
Heightened pleading standards and limits on discovery in private 
securities fraud actions make confidential informants crucial in many 
cases.  While courts have widely recognized the importance of 
confidential informants and the need to protect them from retaliation, 
they have not applied consistent standards as to how informants must be 
identified in pleadings, and have failed to take into account substantial 
bodies of relevant case law when deciding whether to require the 
disclosure of informants’ names in discovery. 
This article offers a framework for deciding when and how 
confidential informants should be identified, taking into account the 
competing interests in anonymity and disclosure.  It offers a refined 
standard for identifying informants at the pleading stage that focuses on 
how the employee came to have the information pleaded, rather than on 
the employee’s job title or duties.  It also proposes use of in camera 
review of witness statements. 
At the discovery stage, this article criticizes the use of the attorney 
work product doctrine as a basis for protecting informant identities.  It 
argues that courts should perform a balancing analysis that directly 
weighs public policy and privacy interests in favor of informant 
anonymity against defendants’ legitimate needs for disclosure.  This 
approach is supported by numerous cases protecting the identities of 
informants and other types of witnesses under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), and 
also finds support in the many cases construing the formal privilege 
applicable to government informants. 
Finally, this article encourages plaintiffs to seek protective orders 
for informants early in litigation and briefly discusses protection for 
witness interview notes. 
 ∗ Mr. Wohl is an attorney with Labaton Sucharow & Rudoff LLP in New York 
City, where he focuses on securities class action litigation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Confidential informants are crucial to detecting and prosecuting 
corporate wrongdoing.1  Threats of retaliation and harm to reputation 
serve, however, as strong disincentives to corporate employees who 
consider stepping forward.2  While individuals who report misconduct 
to the government can generally rely on the “informant’s privilege” to 
preserve their anonymity if they do not testify, no similar privilege 
shields the identities of informants who speak to private plaintiffs or 
their counsel.  As plaintiffs’ law firms—particularly in securities cases 
subject to heightened pleading standards—have hired professional 
investigators and significantly expanded their pre- and post-filing 
investigations, the proper treatment of such private confidential 
informants has become increasingly important.  Striking the proper 
balance between protecting informants’ identities and fair disclosure to 
defendants now has significant consequences for plaintiffs, defendants, 
private litigation as a means of enforcing the nation’s laws, the legal 
system’s commitment to broad discovery, and informants’ ability to 
perform their civic duty without professional martyrdom. 
The competing interests in shielding and disclosing informants’ 
identities arise at three distinct stages of civil litigation: 
(1)  At the pleading stage, when informants’ statements are used to 
establish the legal sufficiency of a claim and defend against a motion to 
dismiss, particularly in securities cases subject to the heightened 
pleading standards imposed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 19953 (“PSLRA”) and Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedures.4
(2)  During discovery, when defendants’ interrogatories often 
specifically request disclosure of plaintiffs’ confidential informants. 
(3)  On a motion for summary judgment or at trial, when an 
informant’s testimony is proffered to a judge or jury for use in 
determining the merits of the controversy. 
This article analyzes courts’ treatment of confidential informants at 
 1. See infra Part I.A. 
 2. See infra Part I.B. 
 3. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 and 18 
U.S.C.). 
 4. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).  Unless otherwise indicated, references herein to “Rules” 
are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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each of these three stages.  Part I evaluates confidential informants’ 
value in enforcement actions and informants’ need for anonymity.  Parts 
II-IV address the pleading, summary judgment/trial, and discovery 
stages, respectively. 
At the pleading stage, courts shield informants’ names but require 
that plaintiffs provide some identifying information.  Slight differences 
in courts’ formulations of what information must be disclosed, however, 
significantly affect the protection that informants receive.  In camera 
review of witness statements and supporting documentation provides 
one mechanism, proposed infra, for insuring that meritorious securities 
fraud cases proceed while protecting defendants from unsupported 
claims. 
At the trial stage, the rule is simply stated: testifying informants 
must be named. 
Finally, the most difficult issues in balancing the competing 
interests in anonymity and disclosure present themselves during the 
discovery stage.  Securities fraud cases on point have reached 
inconsistent results, and have generally failed to consider (or even 
acknowledge) the extensive case law governing the informant’s 
privilege and the balancing analysis that courts have used in other cases 
where public policy and privacy interests support protecting the 
identities of informants and other types of witnesses.  Collectively, these 
cases provide a coherent and nuanced framework for balancing the 
competing interests in anonymity and disclosure for confidential 
informants in securities fraud and other private litigation. 
I.  THE VALUE OF INFORMANTS AND THE NEED FOR PROTECTION 
A.  The Importance of Confidential Informants in  
Prosecuting Violations of Law 
Informants serve a crucial role in detecting and prosecuting 
wrongdoing.  They have been described by a former FBI Director as 
“the single most important tool in law enforcement,”5 and have been 
recognized by the Supreme Court as “a vital part of society’s defensive 
arsenal.”6  Even commentators who are critical of informant-related 
 
 5. ROBERT M. BLOOM, RATTING: THE USE AND ABUSE OF INFORMANTS IN THE 
AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 158 (Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. 2002) (quoting 
William Webster). 
 6. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 307 (1967). 
2007 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS 555 
IN PRIVATE LITIGATION 
 
abuses recognize informants as “a necessary evil.”7  Informants can be 
divided into two categories: the “vast majority”8 who trade “information 
for money or immunity from prosecution,”9 and citizen informants, who 
get “nothing but an assurance of anonymity in return for the information 
provided.”10  Corporate employee-informants, also known as 
whistleblowers, are generally classified as citizen informants, and 
perform what is arguably an especially important role by reporting 
wrongdoing that has the potential to inflict widespread harm, and may 
otherwise be nearly impossible to detect.11
The importance of informants in securities law enforcement is 
illustrated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200212 (“SOX”) and the events 
that led to its enactment.  The popular press reported extensively on the 
efforts of Sherron Watkins, a mid-level manager at Enron, to report 
suspected fraud at the company13—efforts so substantial that she was 
cited in SOX’s legislative history.14  In turn, SOX has been described as 
“us[ing] whistleblower protection as a key component of enforcement of 
federal securities laws.”15  SOX mandated a variety of measures to 
support and protect employees who report wrongdoing.  First, it required 
audit committees to “establish procedures for . . . the confidential, 
anonymous submission by employees of the issuer of concerns 
regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters.”16  Second, SOX 
enacted severe criminal penalties—comparable to those for witness 
 7. BLOOM, supra note 5, at 158. 
 8. 26A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 5702, at 354 (1992). 
 9. Id. at 338. 
 10. Id. at 339. 
 11. See MARLENE WINFIELD, Whistleblowers as Corporate Safety Net, in 
WHISTLEBLOWING—SUBVERSION OR CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP? 21-31 (Gerald Vinten 
ed., 1994). 
 12. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 
28 and 29 U.S.C.). 
 13. See, e.g., Don Van Natta Jr. & Alex Berenson, Enron’s Collapse: The 
Overview; Enron’s Chairman Received Warning About Accounting, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
15, 2002, at A6. 
 14. S. REP. NO. 107-146 (2002). 
 15. DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF 
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE, at vii (BNA Books 2004). 
 16. SOX § 301 (amending Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. § 78f(m)(4) (2002)). 
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tampering17—for “interference with the lawful employment or 
livelihood” of employees who provide information relating to a federal 
offense.18  Finally, SOX established a civil remedy for employees of 
public companies who are the subject of retaliation.  The statute19 
prohibits public companies20 and their employees and agents from 
“discriminat[ing]”21 against an employee who provides information or 
otherwise assists an investigation by federal investigators, Congress, or 
the company itself into violations of (i) criminal mail, wire, bank or 
securities fraud statutes,22 (ii) “any rule or regulation of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission,”23 or (iii) “any provision of Federal law 
relating to fraud against shareholders.”24  It is significant that the statute 
also affords the same protections to employees who “file, cause to be 
filed, testify, participate in, or otherwise assist in a proceeding”25 
relating to the same subjects.  By its terms, this provision provides 
protection for individuals who participate in, or otherwise assist, private 
securities fraud actions. 
Informants are especially valuable in private securities litigation.  
Because such cases are subject to a heightened pleading standard,26 and 
are subject to a discovery stay until the plaintiff has overcome a motion 
to dismiss,27 informants are virtually the only means of obtaining non-
public evidence of wrongdoing at a company, and are often essential for 
avoiding early dismissal of an action. 
B.  Informants’ Need for Protection 
The prevalence of retaliation against informants is widely 
acknowledged.  SOX is only the most recent statute to prohibit 
 
 17. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2002). 
 18. 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2002). 
 19. SOX § 806(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2002). 
 20. Companies “with a class of securities registered under Section 12 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78l), or that is required to file reports 
under Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78o(d)) . . . .”  
Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. (referencing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344 and 1348 (2002), respectively). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. SOX § 806(a)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(2) (2002). 
 26. See infra Part II. 
 27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(b)(1) and 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2002). 
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retaliation against employees who report wrongdoing.  By current count, 
thirty-five other federal statutes also contain explicit provisions 
protecting public and/or private employees from retaliation for reporting 
violations of laws, including numerous environmental statutes, laws 
governing other aspects of public health and safety, laws encouraging 
disclosure of public fraud and waste, and laws regulating the 
workplace,28 most notably the Fair Labor Standards Act29 (“FLSA”).  In 
addition, forty-seven states have enacted statutes protecting public-
sector whistleblowers, and seventeen states also provide some statutory 
protection for private sector employees who report illegal conduct.30
In addition to statutory provisions, the Supreme Court has held that 
the First Amendment protects public sector employees who criticize 
their employers,31 while courts in many states have extended common 
law protection to employees who allege retaliation in response to their 
efforts to prevent or disclose unlawful practices.32
Summing up the policy underlying all of these protections in an 
FLSA case, the Supreme Court observed that “it needs no argument to 
show that fear of economic retaliation might often operate to induce 
aggrieved employees quietly to accept”33 misconduct by their 
employers. 
Courts have also recognized that the chilling effect of possible 
retaliation extends to former employees of a company.  In Hodgson v. 
Charles Martin Inspectors of Petroleum, Inc.,34 the Fifth Circuit 
pointedly rejected the district court’s conclusion that the possibility of 
retaliation against former employees in an FLSA enforcement action 
was “remote and speculative.”35  The Court noted that (i) employers 
“almost invariably require prospective employees to provide the names 
of their previous employers as references when applying for a job,”36 
(ii) a former employee “may be subjected to retaliation by his new 
 28. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 15, app. C. 
 29. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000). 
 30. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 15, at 67, 77. 
 31. The leading case is Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 32. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 15, at 131-38. 
 33. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960). 
 34. 459 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 35. Id. at 306. 
 36. Id. at 307.  Accord Martin v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 148 F.R.D. 56, 63 
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing Hodgson, 459 F.2d at 306). 
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employer if that employer finds out that the employee has in the past”37 
cooperated in an enforcement action, and (iii) a former employee “may 
find it desirable or necessary to seek reemployment with the 
defendant.”38
While SOX provides important remedies for informants faced with 
retaliation, federal courts have repeatedly recognized that “the most 
effective protection from retaliation is the anonymity of the informer.”39  
As the Ninth Circuit has observed, informants (or informers40) are far 
better served “by concealing their identities than by relying on the 
deterrent effect of post hoc remedies under [a statutory] anti-retaliation 
provision.”41  Other courts have consistently agreed.42
Simply stated, many employees will step forward only if their 
anonymity is assured.  Developing appropriate legal standards governing 
disclosure of informants’ identities is therefore crucial to obtaining their 
assistance in detecting and prosecuting corporate wrongdoing. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Wirtz v. Cont’l Fin. & Loan Co. of W. End, 326 F.2d 561, 563-64 (5th Cir. 
1964). 
 40. Courts use the terms “informer” and “informant” interchangeably.  See 26A 
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5702.  For consistency, this article uniformly uses 
the term “informant.” 
 41. Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1071 (9th Cir. 
2000) (internal citation omitted). 
 42. See Dole v. Local 1942, Int’l Bd. of Elec. Workers, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 
1989) (“[T]he most effective means of protection, and by derivation the most effective 
means of fostering citizen cooperation, is bestowing anonymity on the informant, thus 
maintaining the status of the informant’s strategic position and also encouraging others 
similarly situated who have not yet offered their assistance.”); Mitchell v. Roma, 265 
F.2d 633, 637 (3d Cir. 1959) (“The statutory prohibition against retaliation provides 
little comfort to an employee faced with the possibility of subtle pressures by an 
employer, which pressures may be so difficult to prove when seeking to enforce the 
prohibition.”).  Accord NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 239-40 
(1978) stating: 
Respondent’s argument that employers will be deterred from improper intimidation of 
employees who provide statements to the NLRB by the possibility of an [anti-
retaliatory] charge misses the point of Exemption 7(A); the possibility of deterrence 
arising from post hoc disciplinary action is no substitute for a prophylactic rule that 
prevents the harm to a pending enforcement proceeding which flows from a witness’ 
having been intimidated. 
Id. 
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II.  PROTECTION FOR INFORMANTS AT THE PLEADING STAGE 
The issue of how to protect informants first arises at the start of 
litigation, when the complaint is drafted.  In most types of cases, there is 
no basis for requiring a complaint to name confidential informants, or 
even to indicate that informants were the source of the complaint’s 
allegations.  In securities fraud cases, however, the PSLRA requires that 
a complaint “state with particularity all facts”43 supporting an allegation 
that a statement was misleading.  Similarly, Rule 9(b) requires that “the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with 
particularity.”44
A.  Courts Agree that Informants Need Not Be  
Named in a Securities Fraud Complaint 
While the phrase “all facts” can be construed to require that all 
sources be named, and a few early district court cases so held,45 most 
circuit courts have now considered the issue and all have ruled that 
informants need not be identified by name.  Recognizing that such a 
requirement “could deter informants from providing critical information 
to investigators in meritorious cases or invite retaliation against them,” 
the Second Circuit, in the leading case of Novak v. Kasaks,46 held that 
“our reading of the PSLRA rejects any notion that confidential sources 
must be named as a general matter.”47  Novak’s approach has been 
endorsed by the First,48 Third,49 Fifth,50 Seventh,51 Eighth,52 Ninth53 and 
 
 43. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2002). 
 44. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 45. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746, 764 (N.D. Cal. 
1997); In re Nice Sys., Ltd. Sec. Litig., 135 F. Supp. 2d 551 (D.N.J. 2001). 
 46. 216 F.3d 300, 314 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 (2000). 
 47. Id. at 313. 
 48. In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 28-30 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 49. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 146-47 (3d Cir. 
2004). 
 50. ABC Arbitrage Plaintiffs Group v. Tchuruk, 291 F.3d 336, 351-52 (5th Cir. 
2002). 
 51. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 52. Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 667-68 (8th 
Cir. 2001). 
 53. In re Daou Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 411 F.3d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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Tenth54 Circuits.  In four of these decisions, the circuit courts also 
specifically endorsed the Second Circuit’s concern that naming 
informants could have a chilling effect.55  The Seventh Circuit, for 
example, observed that “[a] bright line rule obliging the plaintiffs to 
reveal their sources has the potential to deter informants from exposing 
malfeasance.  Such a rule might also invite retaliation.”56
B.  Courts Disagree About How Informants Should Be Identified 
While courts now uniformly agree that a complaint need not 
identify confidential informants by name, the circuit courts do not agree 
on what type of identifying materials must be supplied.  The Second 
Circuit has required that confidential sources be “described in the 
complaint with sufficient particularity to support the probability that a 
person in the position occupied by the source would possess the 
information alleged.”57  The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have adopted 
this formulation.58  The First Circuit, by contrast, calls for “evaluation, 
inter alia, of the level of detail provided by the confidential sources, the 
corroborative nature of the other facts alleged (including from other 
sources), the coherence and plausibility of the allegations, the number of 
sources, the reliability of the sources, and similar indicia.”59  The Third 
Circuit has adopted substantially the same criteria as the First Circuit,60 
and the Ninth Circuit has also approved use of the First Circuit’s criteria 
to “augment[]” the Second Circuit’s approach in Novak.61  The Tenth 
Circuit has adopted the loosest standard, rejecting a “per se rule that a 
plaintiff’s complaint must always identify the source.”62  Under the 
Tenth Circuit’s approach, source information is more important for 
allegations that “are difficult to verify, such as allegations of secret 
meetings, the contents of private conversations, or alleged 
 
 54. Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1101 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 55. In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 30 (1st Cir. 2002); Cal. Pub. 
Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 147 (3d Cir. 2004); Tchuruk, 291 
F.3d at 352-53; Makor, 437 F.3d at 596. 
 56. Makor, 437 F.3d at 596. 
 57. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 314 (2000). 
 58. Makor, 437 F.3d at 596 (quoting Novak); Tchuruk, 291 F.3d at 353 (adopting a 
substantially identical formulation). 
 59. Cabletron, 311 F.3d at 29-30. 
 60. Chubb, 394 F.3d at 147. 
 61. In re Daou Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 411 F.3d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 62. Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1101 (10th Cir. 2003). 
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motivations,”63 than for allegations that “may be objectively 
verifiable,”64 such as “specific contract terms, the financial result of a 
transaction, or specific prevailing market conditions.”65
How informants are identified is important.  Practice teaches that 
defendants often devote significant effort to ferreting out informants, 
and are frequently successful in their efforts.  Executive suites—where 
most actionable frauds are perpetrated—are small enough at most public 
companies that a job title or description of responsibilities, for the 
insiders who matter, will be the equivalent of naming the witness.  At 
the same time, identifying an informant by job title or responsibilities 
poorly serves defendants’ interest in protection against meritless claims.  
As one court has noted, job titles may convey little about actual job 
duties,66 and formal job duties may say little about whether an employee 
would have been privy to senior-level communications evidencing 
actionable misconduct. 
Of greater relevance is an explanation of how the employee came to 
have the information pleaded.  Junior employees in unlikely positions 
can provide credible (albeit hearsay) evidence of wrongdoing through 
friendship with a strategically placed coworker.  At the same time, a 
court ought to assign less weight to a well-placed senior executive who 
has come to particular knowledge through unreliable office gossip. 
Thus the better approach is to require specificity as to how the 
source came to possess the information pleaded, for example, that the 
witness had direct access to relevant communications as a part of her job 
responsibilities, or that the witness learned of the relevant facts through 
a close relationship with a co-worker who was directed to execute a part 
of the scheme. 
This analysis is consistent with each of the appeals courts’ 
formulations cited supra.  It fits well with the First, Third, Ninth and 
Tenth Circuits’ “totality of the circumstances” approach, and also 
conforms to the Second, Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ approach (applying 
the light gloss of reading “position” in the sense of “situation” as 
opposed to “post of employment”).67
 63. Id at 1102. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. In re Northpoint Commc’ns Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 221 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 
1097 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 67. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1413 (3d 
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C.  In Camera Review of Witness Interview Notes Serves the Interests of 
Plaintiffs, Defendants and the Court 
Whatever test is applied, a challenge for plaintiffs remains: 
determining the appropriate level of detail to use in describing 
informants.  The degree of particularity required to survive a motion to 
dismiss varies from judge to judge, based both on individual 
assessments of what “particularity” means and, inevitably, on the 
judge’s perception of the merits of the case.  A plaintiff who provides 
too much detail risks “outing” its informants; a plaintiff who provides 
too little risks dismissal of the cause.  The same drafting problem applies 
to supporting documentation, such as an incriminating email that reflects 
which recipient’s copy has been printed. 
One solution is for plaintiffs to proffer witness statements and 
supporting documentation for in camera review.  In camera inspection 
of materials is, of course, “well established in the federal courts”68 in 
connection with claims of privilege, and has been strongly endorsed in 
that context by the Supreme Court.69
Although supplementing a complaint with materials supplied in 
camera and ex parte is rare at best,70 this is unsurprising given the norm 
of simple notice pleading under Rule 8(a) and the fact that widespread 
use of informants in private litigation is a recent development.  While 
“‘[o]ur adversarial legal system generally does not tolerate ex parte 
determinations on the merits of a civil case,’”71 similar concerns are not 
implicated at the pleading stage.  In addition, criminal law provides a 
clear precedent for use of ex parte materials supplied in camera to make 
a threshold showing of merit at the commencement of a case: such 
 
ed. 1996). 
 68. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 569 (1989). 
 69. Kerr v. District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 405-06 (1976) (“this Court has long held 
the view that in camera review is a highly appropriate and useful means of dealing 
with” certain claims of privilege); see also Zolin, 491 U.S. at 568-69 (“this Court has 
approved the practice of requiring parties who seek to avoid disclosure of documents to 
make the documents available for in camera inspection”). 
 70. Our research, in fact, found no reported examples. 
 71. Vining v. Runyon, 99 F.3d 1056, 1057 (11th Cir. 1996) (summary judgment 
motion, quoting Application of Eisenberg, 654 F.2d 1107, 1112 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 
1981) (alteration in original)).  Apparently the sole exception, as noted in Vining, is 
when “the submissions involve compelling national security concerns or the statute 
granting the cause of action specifically provides for in camera resolution of the 
dispute.”  Id. at 1057. 
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materials are routinely submitted to support the filing of a criminal 
complaint and issuance of an arrest warrant pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.72  Under Rule 4(a), an arrest 
warrant will issue upon “probable cause to believe that an offense has 
been committed and that the defendant committed it . . . .”  The issuing 
judge, in turn, determines “probable cause” by considering the “totality-
of-the-circumstances,” that is, “all the circumstances set forth in the 
[complaint or] affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis 
of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information . . . .”73  This 
determination is ordinarily made on an ex parte basis, and indeed often 
relies heavily on information supplied by anonymous informants.74
The First Circuit noted, in its decision approving the use of 
anonymous informants in securities cases, the similarity of ex parte 
probable cause determinations in criminal cases to the court’s task in 
evaluating the sufficiency of a securities fraud complaint.75  The court 
described probable cause determinations as a “helpful analogy” to 
evaluating the sufficiency of complaints subject to the PSLRA.76
In camera review also serves judicial efficiency.  The challenges of 
drafting a legally sufficient securities fraud complaint were fairly 
described by the Ninth Circuit in Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, 
Inc.:77
But how much detail is enough detail?  When is an inference of 
deliberate recklessness sufficiently strong?  There is no bright-line 
rule.  Sometimes it is easy to tell, but often it is not . . . .  In this 
technical and demanding corner of the law, the drafting of a 
 72. The criminal precedent should a fortiori defeat any due process concerns, since 
“the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant may be viewed as ‘qualitatively more 
significant’ than the outcome of civil litigation.”  Holman v. Cayce, 873 F.2d 944, 946 
(6th Cir. 1989). 
 73. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233, 238 (1983).  See also United States v. 
Pardue, 385 F.3d 101, 107 (1st Cir. 2004) (evaluating “probable cause” for an arrest). 
 74. See generally, Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (discussing when use of informants’ 
testimony is permissible); 26A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5714 (discussing 
when a criminal defendant is entitled to obtain disclosure of the identity of confidential 
informants whose statements had been used to establish probable cause to search or 
arrest). 
 75. In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 11 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 76. Id. at 30. 
 77. 316 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2003). 
564 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF Vol. XII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
cognizable complaint can be a matter of trial and error.78
The Ninth Circuit cited these challenges as support for its holding 
that plaintiffs should be liberally granted leave to replead in securities 
fraud cases.  No party, however, benefits from drafting and briefing 
seriatim amended complaints and motions to dismiss.  By allowing 
plaintiffs to present all their supporting materials, in camera review 
reduces the need for trial-and-error pleading and lets the court evaluate 
the sufficiency of a complaint taking into account all support that the 
plaintiff has adduced for its allegations. 
Finally, the statutory purposes underlying the PSLRA and Rule 9(b) 
support use of the in camera device.  The PSLRA required detailed 
pleading “to curtail the filing of meritless lawsuits.”79  Rule 9(b) 
similarly “gives defendants notice of the claims against them, provides 
an increased measure of protection for their reputations, and reduces the 
number of frivolous suits brought solely to extract settlements.”80  At the 
same time, Congress, in enacting the PSLRA, characterized private 
securities litigation as “an indispensable tool” for injured investors,81 
and courts have cautioned that they “should be sensitive to the fact that 
application of [Rule 9(b)] prior to discovery may permit sophisticated 
defrauders to successfully conceal the details of their fraud.”82  As these 
statements indicate, the PSLRA seeks a balance that excludes 
unmeritorious cases while allowing valid claims to proceed.  As the 
Supreme Court held in evaluating claims of privilege, “it would seem 
that an in camera review . . . is a relatively costless and eminently 
worthwhile method to insure that the balance . . . is correctly struck.”83
III.  PROTECTION FOR INFORMANTS AT THE TRIAL  
AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT STAGE 
Due process provides a simple rule for disclosure of informants’ 
identities at trial and on summary judgment: absent “acute national 
 78. Id. at 1052. 
 79. H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740. 
 80. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1418 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 81. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 
(1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730. 
 82. Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1418 (internal quotations omitted).  See 
also 2 JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 9.03[1][b] (3d ed. 1997). 
 83. Kerr v. District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 405 (1976). 
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security concerns,”84 anonymous testimony is never allowed, and 
testifying informants’ identities must therefore always be disclosed.85
Whether a witness’ status as an informant need be revealed is not as 
clear.  One commentator suggests it does, stating, “the fact that he is an 
informer must of course be disclosed as a significant aspect of his 
credibility.”86  The Fifth Circuit, when confronted with the issue in an 
FLSA case, held that the informants did not need to be identified as such 
when lists of trial witnesses were exchanged.87
The proper rule should depend on the type of informant.  If an 
informant receives a tangible benefit, such as money or immunity from 
prosecution, that information clearly goes to the informant’s credibility.  
No similar justification, however, supports identification of a citizen 
informant who receives nothing but an assurance of anonymity. 
IV.  PROTECTION FOR INFORMANTS AT THE DISCOVERY STAGE 
The hardest issues concerning the balance of competing interests in 
 84. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1060-61 (D.C. Cir. 1986).  The court 
noted that: 
[i]t is a hallmark of our adversary system that we safeguard party access to the 
evidence tendered in support of a requested court judgment.  The openness of judicial 
proceedings serves to preserve both the appearance and the reality of fairness in the 
adjudications of United States courts.  It is therefore the firmly held main rule that a 
court may not dispose of the merits of a case on the basis of ex parte, in camera 
submissions. 
Id. 
 85. See Reich v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 58, 
62 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (“The informer’s privilege does not override the government’s 
duty to disclose the identity of witnesses who will testify at trial.”); Hansberry v. Father 
Flanagan’s Boys’ Home, No. CV-03-3006 (CPS), 2004 WL 3152393, at *4 n.9 
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2004) (declining in camera review of affidavit proffered on a 
summary judgment motion); Wirtz v. Hooper-Holmes Bureau, Inc., 327 F.2d 939, 943 
(5th Cir. 1964) (requiring disclosure of all witnesses, including confidential informants, 
shortly before trial).  Although few decisions squarely address this issue, commentators, 
recognizing the fundamental due process dimension of the issue, describe it as a firm 
rule.  See 26A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5710, at 404-05 (“the government 
cannot assert the privilege to refuse to disclose the witnesses it will call at trial”); 2 
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 510:1 (6th ed. 2006) (“[i]f 
the government calls the informer at trial, the witness’s identity . . . must of course be 
disclosed”). 
 86. 2 GRAHAM, supra note 85, § 510:1. 
 87. Wirtz v. Robinson & Stephens, Inc., 368 F.2d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1966). 
566 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF Vol. XII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
preserving informants’ anonymity and compelling their disclosure 
appear at the discovery stage.  Absent a “lucky guess,” withholding an 
informant’s identity necessarily denies the defendant the chance to 
depose the informant, a result contrary to both the “broad and liberal” 
discovery contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,88 and 
the principle that “the public has a right to every man’s evidence.”89
When evaluating whether a confidential witness must be identified 
during discovery, it is important to note what is and what is not at stake.  
Because “[t]rial by surprise is no longer countenanced,”90 informants 
who a party intends to call must be identified in response to a proper 
interrogatory during discovery. 
Whether the identity of confidential informants can be learned 
through discovery therefore concerns a limited class of individuals: 
those who provided confidential information to the plaintiff or plaintiff’s 
counsel, but who will not later be called as witnesses at trial.  While 
limited, protection of this group of informants is crucial.  As noted 
supra,91 non-testifying informants are the principal source of non-public 
information that plaintiffs rely on to meet the heightened pleading 
standards under Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA.  In addition, informants often 
become willing to testify at trial only after developing a rapport with 
counsel and seeing that their testimony may contribute to successful 
prosecution of the lawsuit.  Thus, even in the case of witnesses who later 
agree to testify, plaintiffs are far more likely to persuade a witness to 
have an initial conversation if they can represent that the conversation is 
likely to be protected (or, better yet, is the subject of a protective order, 
as discussed infra).92
Disclosure of confidential witnesses during discovery has been the 
subject of reported decisions in a number of securities cases.  Until 
Judge Michael Baylson’s decision last year in In re Cigna Corp. 
 88. Pacitti v. Macy’s, 193 F.3d 766, 777 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 89. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 
U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (quoting 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192, at 64 (3d ed. 
1940)) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted)). 
 90. Reno Air Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1140 (9th Cir. 2006). 
See also Brown Badgett, Inc. v. Jennings, 842 F.2d 899, 902 (6th Cir. 1988) (purpose of 
liberal discovery is to “make a trial less a game of blind man’s bluff and more a fair 
contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent” 
(quoting United States v. Proctor and Gamble & Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958))). 
 91. See Part I.A. 
 92. See Part IV.F. 
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Securities Litigation,93 however, these cases evaluated protection of 
informants principally on the basis of the attorney work product 
doctrine.94  While the public interest in informant confidentiality was 
discussed in some decisions, this interest was evaluated mainly in the 
context of determining whether the identity of such witnesses 
constituted protected attorney work product.95
Outside of the securities context, however, several courts have 
focused directly on the public policy and privacy interests at stake.  
Their approach is consistent with substantial bodies of case law that 
construe the government informant’s privilege, and evaluate the need for 
disclosure of the identities of other types of witnesses, in situations 
where public policy or privacy concerns militate against the general 
policy of full disclosure. 
A.  Attorney Work Product as a Basis for Protection 
Securities cases addressing the protection of confidential informants 
on the basis of attorney work product split on whether informants’ 
identities must be disclosed. 
The justification for protecting informant identities as attorney 
work product was best articulated in In re MTI Technologies Corp. 
Securities Litigation II.96  The court noted that the work product doctrine 
generally protects trial preparation materials, and explained that “if the 
identity of interviewed witnesses is disclosed, opposing counsel can 
infer which witnesses counsel considers important, revealing mental 
impressions and trial strategy.”97
While the MTI decision has persuaded one sister California district 
court,98 attorney work product has not carried the day elsewhere.  In In 
 
 93. No. Civ. A. 02-8088, 2006 WL 263631 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2006). 
 94. See infra cases discussed in Part IV.A. 
 95. In re MTI Technologies Corp. Sec. Litig. II, SACV 00-0745 DOC, 2002 WL 
32344347, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2002); In re Ashworth, Inc. Sec. Litig., 213 F.R.D. 
385, 389 (S.D. Cal. 2002); In re Aetna Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CIV. A. MDL 1219, 1999 
WL 354527, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 1999); Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 572 Pension 
Fund v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. C01-20418JW, 2005 WL 1459555, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 
21, 2005); Miller v. Ventro Corp., No. C01-01287 SBA (EDL), 2004 WL 868202, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2004). 
 96. 2002 WL 32344347. 
 97. Id. at *3. 
 98. Ashworth, 213 F.R.D. 385.  MTI’s analysis was also adopted by the court in 
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re Aetna Inc. Securities Litigation,99 Judge Padova of the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania rejected a claim of work product protection for 
informants’ names, on the grounds that such information either was not 
work product at all, or, in the alternative “at most has minimal work 
product content [and] the need for the information sought outweighs the 
minimal work product content that such information may have.”100  
Judge Padova’s analysis has been adopted by a number of other district 
courts in published opinions.101
Plaintiffs’ lack of success in invoking the work product doctrine is 
unsurprising, in light of the fact that the doctrine is premised on the 
principle that “it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of 
privacy”102 and, by the express language of Rule 26(b)(3), only protects 
“mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories.”103  This 
framework presents no basis for according weight to the public policy in 
favor of detecting corporate wrongdoing or to informants’ privacy 
interests. 
In the cases cited supra, the courts have attempted to distinguish 
decisions reaching the opposite result by pointing to the number of 
individuals “likely to have discoverable information”104 who were 
named by the plaintiffs in initial disclosures or in response to 
interrogatories.  In Aetna, for example, the court noted that the plaintiffs 
had named roughly 750 individuals and observed that “[w]ithout the 
Court’s intervention, Defendants would be forced to engage in a time-
consuming and expensive effort to ferret out the veritable needle in the 
haystack.”105  In MTI, the court observed that the plaintiffs had listed 
Electronic Data Systems Corp. v. Steingraber, No. 4:02 CV 225, 2003 WL 21653405, 
at *2 (E.D. Tex. July 9, 2003), a non-securities case. 
 99. 1999 WL 354527. 
 100. Id. at *2. 
 101. In re Theragenics Corp. Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 631 (N.D. Ga. 2002); Miller v. 
Ventro Corp., No. C01-01287 SBA (EDL), 2004 WL 868202 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 
2004); Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 572 Pension Fund v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. C01-
20418JW, 2005 WL 1459555 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2005); In re Priceline.com Inc. Sec. 
Litig., No. 3:00 CV 01884 (DJS), 2005 WL 1366450 (D. Conn. June 7, 2005).  See also 
In re IPO Sec. Litig., 220 F.R.D. 30 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (rejecting claim of attorney work 
product and requiring disclosure of investors who had engaged in arm’s-length 
purchases of shares from the defendants in initial public offerings). 
 102. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947). 
 103. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
 104. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A). 
 105. 1999 WL 354527, at *4. 
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only seventy-one current and former employees, “not even close to the 
unmanageable number present in Aetna.”106  Other courts have held 
1,200 and “at least 165” names to be too many,107 but “approximately 
100” to be reasonable.108  These attempts to draw a line of demarcation 
between a witness list that hides the ball to an acceptable degree, and 
one that hides the ball too well, are ill-advised.  Requiring plaintiffs to 
name confidential informants, but conceal them among a long list of 
other persons with knowledge, results in an unhappy compromise that 
forces defendants to depose third parties who may be only tangentially 
involved.  Depending on the stakes of the litigation and the defendant’s 
resources, the cost of deposing all witnesses may be prohibitive and 
therefore constitute a de facto denial of access to the informants.  At the 
same time, hiding informants among other witnesses may not provide 
adequate protection.  Depending on how plaintiffs derive their list of 
persons with knowledge, even a list of 1,000 names may not effectively 
camouflage a senior informant or one with specialized knowledge or job 
duties. 
The better approach, set forth infra, is to develop principled rules 
for when informants must be named, and when their names may be 
withheld altogether.  Securities plaintiffs’ focus on attorney work 
product simply neglects the established framework for recognizing the 
public policy interests at stake—concerns that have been specifically 
acknowledged, as noted supra,109 by a majority of the circuit courts that 
have considered pleading-stage disclosure of informants in PSLRA 
cases.  Outside of the securities context, courts have readily 
acknowledged these interests when asked to shield the identities of 
informants and other individuals, as discussed infra. 
B.  The Informant’s Privilege as Precedent  
for Protection of Private Informants 
Although not addressed by any of the district court decisions 
 
 106. In re MTI Technologies Corp. Sec. Litig. II, No. SACV 00-0745 DOC, 2002 
WL 32344347, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2002). 
 107. Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 572 Pension Fund v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. C01-
20418JW, 2005 WL 1459555 at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2005); Miller v. Ventro Corp., 
No. C01-01287 SBA (EDL), 2004 WL 868202 at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2004). 
 108. In re Ashworth, Inc. Sec. Litig., 213 F.R.D. 385, 390 (S.D. Cal. 2002). 
 109. See supra, Part II.A. 
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discussed supra, the identities of confidential government informants 
have been protected since at least the nineteenth century.110  The 
Supreme Court first recognized the “informant’s privilege” in its current 
form in 1957, holding in Roviaro v. United States111 that informants’ 
identities were generally not subject to discovery to further “the public 
interest in effective law enforcement.”112  The Court explained that 
“[t]he privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens to communicate 
their knowledge of the commission of crimes to law-enforcement 
officials and, by preserving their anonymity, encourages them to 
perform that obligation.”113  While described as the “informant’s 
privilege,” the Court in Roviaro explained that it “is in reality the 
Government’s privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of 
persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged 
with enforcement of that law.”114  Consistent with its purpose and 
function, the informant’s privilege is applicable to government 
informants in both civil cases and criminal prosecutions.115 
 Under Roviaro, the privilege is qualified; when an informant’s 
identity “is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is 
essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give 
way.”116  In a criminal case, this standard 
calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of 
information against the individual’s right to prepare his defense.  
Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must 
depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into 
consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible 
significance of the informer’s testimony, and other relevant 
factors.117
Unlike most other privileges, such as attorney-client or 
 110. See 26A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, § 5702, at 340-41. 
 111. 353 U.S. 53 (1957). 
 112. Id. at 59. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Brock v. On Shore Quality Control Specialists, Inc., 811 F.2d 282, 283 (5th 
Cir. 1987) (“Although Roviaro was a criminal case, the privilege uniformly has been 
applied in civil cases as well.”).  A compilation of civil cases can be found in Thomas J. 
Oliver, Annotation, Application, in Federal Civil Action, of Governmental Privilege of 
Nondisclosure of Identity of Informer, 8 A.L.R. FED. 6 (1971). 
 116. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60-61. 
 117. Id. at 62. 
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psychotherapist-patient, which broadly protect the contents of 
communications, the informant’s privilege protects only the identity of 
the informant, and shields documents only to the extent they “tend to 
reveal the identity of” an informant.118  Thus, witness statements and 
similar materials are discoverable—subject to redaction to remove 
identifying information, and any other applicable privileges and 
limitations on disclosure.119
A substantial body of criminal and civil case law following Roviaro 
has fully developed the parameters of the privilege.  First, consistent 
with the due process principles noted supra, the identity of an informant 
who appears as a witness at trial must virtually always be disclosed.120  
When an informant is not called to testify, cases following Roviaro 
focus principally on the relationship of the informant to the crime 
charged or wrongdoing alleged.  Ordinarily, disclosure is required in 
criminal cases if the informant is the only participant other than the 
accused, or is the only witness able to confirm or refute the testimony of 
government witnesses.121  Disclosure is generally not required when the 
informant is a “mere tipster,” even if also a witness to the crime.122  In 
cases that fall between these extremes, courts resort to balancing, as 
prescribed in Roviaro.123
Claims of privilege in civil litigation arise most often in wage and 
hour cases under the FLSA.124  As in the criminal context, the requesting 
 118. Id. at 60 (“The scope of the privilege is limited by its underlying purpose.  
Thus, where the disclosure of the contents of a communication will not tend to reveal 
the identity of an informer, the contents are not privileged.”).  See also United States v. 
Sanchez, 988 F.2d 1384, 1391 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Roviaro for this proposition). 
 119. See disclosure of witness interview notes, infra notes 188-194 and 
accompanying text. 
 120. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
 121. See United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 920-21 (1st Cir. 1991); see 
generally 2 GRAHAM, supra note 85, § 510:1; 26A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, 
§ 5713, at 434-37. 
 122. Martinez, 922 F.2d at 921. 
 123. United States v. Gill, 58 F.3d 1414, 1421 (9th Cir. 1995) (Roviaro balancing is 
based on “(1) the degree to which the informant was involved in the criminal activity; 
(2) how helpful the informant’s testimony would be to the defendant; [and] (3) the 
government’s interest in non-disclosure.”); 26A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, 
§ 5713, at 438-39. 
 124. See 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2019, at 301 n.11 (2d ed. 1994) (collecting 
cases), and the numerous FLSA cases cited in this article. 
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party can override the privilege by showing that its need for disclosure 
outweighs the government’s interest in confidentiality.  This need is 
evaluated both by assessing the relationship between the informant and 
the wrong alleged, as in criminal cases,125 and also by directly 
evaluating the relevancy of the informant’s identity to the facts at issue 
in the case.126
C.  Extension of the Informant’s Privilege to Private Informants 
The clear and well-defined nature of the government informant’s 
privilege invites extension to those who assist private plaintiffs, and at a 
minimum to plaintiffs acting as “private attorneys general.”  While 
opponents of private enforcement actions argue they lead to excessive 
litigation, interfere with public enforcement, and lack accountability,127 
these opponents do not question the significant deterrent effect of private 
litigation.  Furthermore, none of the arguments against private 
enforcement supports depriving plaintiffs of a tool essential to their 
ability to detect and gather proof of serious wrongdoing.  The asserted 
deficiencies of private actions may in fact be ameliorated by 
enhancement of plaintiffs’ information-gathering tools. 
In addition, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the 
important role of private enforcement actions in the case of private 
securities fraud actions,128 and Congress, even while imposing limits on 
private actions in the PSLRA, stated in its legislative history that: 
 
 125. See Suarez v. United States, 582 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 1978) (refusing 
disclosure of an informant in a civil tax enforcement case, noting that he was merely a 
“marginal observer of the activities” of the taxpayers); Holman v. Cayce, 873 F.2d 944, 
947 (6th Cir. 1989) (refusing disclosure in a § 1983 action alleging a wrongful shooting 
by an arresting officer where “[t]here was no indication that the informant was an active 
participant in the burglary or a witness to it”). 
 126. Wirtz v. Cont’l Fin. & Loan Co., 326 F.2d 561, 563 (5th Cir. 1964) (“It is 
perfectly plain that the names of informers are utterly irrelevant to the issues to be tried 
by the trial court.”).  Accord Usery v. Ritter, 547 F.2d 528, 531 (10th Cir. 1977) and 
Brock v. On Shore Quality Control Specialists, Inc., 811 F.2d 282, 284 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 127. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The 
Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 114-20 
(2005). 
 128. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985) 
(“[W]e repeatedly have emphasized that implied private actions provide ‘a most 
effective weapon in the enforcement’ of the securities laws and are ‘a necessary 
supplement to Commission action.’”) (citing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 
(1964)). 
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[p]rivate securities litigation is an indispensable tool with which 
defrauded investors can recover their losses without having to rely 
upon government action.  Such private lawsuits promote public and 
global confidence in our capital markets and help to deter 
wrongdoing and to guarantee that corporate officers, auditors, 
directors, lawyers and others properly perform their jobs.129
Decisions applying the current version of the privilege in civil cases 
further illustrate why extending the informant’s privilege is appropriate.  
Several courts have reasoned that “[s]ince the guilt or innocence of a 
criminal defendant may be viewed as ‘qualitatively more significant’ 
than the outcome of civil litigation,” the privilege should actually be 
stronger and yield less frequently in the civil context.130
While informants in civil litigation are less likely to face threats to 
life and limb, courts have recognized that the informant’s privilege 
“[a]lso recognizes the subtler forms of retaliation such as blacklisting, 
economic duress and social ostracism.”131
The fact that corporate misconduct—particularly, fraud and 
antitrust offenses—regularly gives rise to parallel criminal prosecutions 
and (private) civil cases further supports extension of the privilege and 
demonstrates the lack of any good justification for applying different 
rules to governmental and non-governmental informants.  It would be 
perverse indeed to hold that an indicted corporate officer facing years in 
prison and loss of reputation was barred by the privilege from obtaining 
the identities of informants located by prosecutors, while her former 
 129. Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, Conference 
Report on Securities Litigation Reform, H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. 
Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730. 
 130. Holman v. Cayce, 873 F.2d 944, 946 (6th Cir. 1989).  See also Dole v. Local 
1942, Int’l Bd. of Elec. Workers, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1989) (“In civil cases the 
privilege, which limits the right of disclosure usually called for by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, is arguably greater since not all constitutional guarantees which inure 
to criminal defendants are similarly available to civil defendants.”) (citations omitted); 
Mgmt. Info. Techs., Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 151 F.R.D. 478, 483 n.2 
(D.D.C. 1993) (“It would seem rather incongruous for courts to decline to turn over 
such information in proceedings where a defendant’s liberty is at stake while providing 
such materials in a civil setting where monetary damages alone are involved.”); Matter 
of Search of 1638 E. 2nd Street, Tulsa, Okl., 993 F.2d 773, 775 (10th Cir. 1993) (in 
civil cases, “the informer’s privilege is arguably stronger, because the constitutional 
guarantees assured to criminal defendants are inapplicable”). 
 131. Dole, 870 F.2d at 372. 
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employer, facing the loss of a few basis points of quarterly earnings in a 
class action, was entitled to broader discovery of the names of 
informants located by plaintiffs’ counsel. 
While these considerations underscore the appropriateness of 
protecting non-governmental informants in private litigation, the 
Supreme Court’s privileges jurisprudence has effectively foreclosed 
formal expansion of the informant’s privilege as the means to do so.  
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that the federal law 
of privileges “shall be governed by the principles of the common law as 
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of 
reason and experience.”  The Supreme Court has recognized that this 
provision “authorizes federal courts to define new privileges.”132  But 
the Court has repeatedly confirmed that “the public has a right to every 
man’s evidence”133 and that “there is a general duty to give what 
testimony one is capable of giving, and that any exceptions which may 
exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many derogations from a 
positive general rule.”134  Accordingly, the Court has held that 
evidentiary privileges “are not lightly created nor expansively 
construed,”135 and has declined most invitations to create or expand 
privileges.136
Under the leading Supreme Court case addressing the creation of 
new privileges, the common law analysis begins with an evaluation of 
the interests supporting the privilege.137  While the interests in insuring 
the free flow of information from informants are manifest, they are 
mitigated by another factor—the need for certainty and predictability in 
application of the evidentiary privilege.  For many privileges, such as 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege at issue in Jaffee, or the spousal 
 132. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 (1996). 
 133. Id. at 9 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (quoting 8 
WIGMORE, supra note 89, § 2192, at 64) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis 
omitted)). 
 134. Id. (quoting Bryan, 339 U.S. at 331) (quoting 8 WIGMORE, supra note 89, 
§ 2192, at 64) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted)). 
 135. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). 
 136. See Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990) (rejecting academic peer 
review privilege); United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980) (rejecting privilege for 
“legislative acts”); United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989) (rejecting claim that in 
camera review of materials to determine applicability of crime-fraud exception would 
impair attorney-client privilege); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) 
(holding that voluntary testimony by spouse was not barred by spousal privilege). 
 137. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11. 
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privilege recognized in Hawkins v. United States,138 the protected 
communications typically occur before litigation has commenced, and 
potentially before it is even anticipated.  Accordingly, the interests at 
stake call for a clear rule to guide members of the public in their 
conduct.  By contrast, contacts with informants occur in conjunction 
with litigation.  As a result, the relevant facts can be presented to the 
presiding judge for a case-by-case determination with little harm to the 
relevant interests. 
The other principal factor discussed in Jaffee was the treatment of 
this privilege amongst the states.139  Because no state had recognized an 
informant’s privilege for non-governmental informants, this factor 
weighs significantly against the recognition of an expanded privilege.  
The same is true of a third factor discussed in Jaffee—whether the 
privilege was included among those proposed by the Advisory 
Committee on Rules of Evidence in 1969.140  The Advisory Committee 
made no provision for protection of non-governmental informants.141
While Supreme Court precedents do not therefore support 
expanding the informant’s privilege, other decisions by circuit and 
district courts around the country reflect consistent use of a case-by-
case, balancing approach to achieve a similar result. 
D.  Balancing the Interests in Anonymity and Disclosure 
All of the factors mentioned supra, including the value of 
confidential informants in enforcement actions, informants’ need for 
protection, the important role of private litigation, and the lack of 
justification for different standards of protection in government and 
private actions, argue in favor of protecting the identities of private 
confidential informants.  In the absence of a formal privilege, the few 
courts outside of the securities arena that have faced demands for the 
disclosure of confidential witnesses have provided this protection 
through a balancing analysis.  Many other courts have adopted the same 
 
 138. 358 U.S. 74 (1958). 
 139. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12-13. 
 140. Id. at 14-15 (citing inclusion of a psychotherapist-patient privilege among the 
Advisory Committee’s proposed rules). 
 141. Proposed Rule 510, rejected by Congress, would have codified the common 
law informant’s privilege, but was limited to governmental informants.  See Proposed 
Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 255 (1972). 
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approach in other situations where public policy and privacy interests 
support the protection of witnesses’ identities.  As a number of these 
cases illustrate, courts often adopt a balancing analysis in lieu of creating 
a new privilege.142
The First Circuit’s decision in Gill v. Gulfstream Park Racing 
Ass’n, Inc.143 reflects the proper approach.  In Gill, a racehorse owner 
sued a racetrack operator for defamation in connection with a private 
investigation into wrongdoing by the owner.  The plaintiff subpoenaed 
documents from a (non-party) trade association that had initiated the 
investigation.  The trade association opposed the subpoena on the 
grounds that the documents contained the names of confidential 
informants.  The district court held the informant’s privilege 
inapplicable, and declined to protect the identities of the informants.144  
The First Circuit vacated and remanded.  It agreed that the applicable 
state-law informant’s privilege did not apply, but held that the “‘[t]he 
“good cause” standard in [Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)] is a flexible one that 
requires an individualized balancing of the many interests that may be 
 142. E.g., Gill v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, Inc., 399 F.3d 391 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(rejecting privilege for private informant but remanding so that the trial court could 
perform a balancing analysis); Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 926-27 
(7th Cir. 2004) (rejecting privilege for abortion records but quashing subpoena under 
balancing analysis); In re Sealed Case (Med. Records), 381 F.3d 1205, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (noting that “even where an evidentiary privilege is not available, a party may 
petition the court for a protective order” and remanding for a determination of whether 
such an order was proper); Solarex Corp. v. Arco Solar, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 163 (E.D.N.Y. 
1988) (rejecting scholarly journal peer review privilege but protecting identity of peer 
reviewer under balancing analysis), aff’d, 870 F.2d 642 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Virmani v. 
Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284, 288 n.4 (4th Cir. 2001) (rejecting medical peer 
review privilege but noting that an order protecting the identities of third parties would 
be proper); Seales v. Macomb Co., 226 F.R.D. 572, 578-79 (E.D. Mich. 2005) 
(rejecting juvenile records privilege but redacting identifying information based on 
balancing analysis); Ross v. Bolton, 106 F.R.D. 22, 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding that no 
private investigatory privilege existed but protecting investigatory records based on 
balancing analysis).  Such balancing differs significantly from the recognition of a new 
privilege because, under Rule 26(c), the party seeking protection bears the burden of 
persuasion.  See infra note 171 and accompanying text.  By contrast, in the case of the 
informant’s privilege, as with others, “the government is granted the privilege as of 
right.”  Dole v. Local 1942, Int’l Bd. of Elec. Workers, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 
1989). 
 143. 399 F.3d 391 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 144. Id. at 393-94. 
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present in a particular case.’”145  Under Rule 26(c), “[i]n particular, 
considerations of the public interest, the need for confidentiality, and 
privacy interests are relevant factors to be balanced.”146  By failing to 
recognize and evaluate these interests, the First Circuit held that the 
district court had abused its discretion.147
A similar approach was adopted by Judge Sporkin in Management 
Information Technologies, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.148  There, 
the defendant sought discovery of sources who had allegedly provided 
the plaintiff with confidential company documents.  Judge Sporkin 
discussed at length the risk of retaliation to which whistleblowers are 
exposed, and declined to order disclosure of the sources.149  He 
described his ruling as “based on the Court’s balancing of the interest of 
third parties with the needs of the defendants to defend themselves in the 
present proceeding” and noted that the “identities of the confidential 
informants . . . are at best marginally relevant to the issues at stake in 
this litigation.”150
In In re Cigna Corp. Securities Litigation,151 Judge Baylson 
focused directly on the value of, and need to protect, confidential 
informants, and held that while defendants were entitled to a list of all 
“persons with relevant knowledge,” including all informants, plaintiffs 
were not required to specifically identify their informants from among 
the universe of all persons with knowledge.152
 145. Id. at 402 (quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 165 F.3d 952, 959-60 
(D.C. Cir. 1999)). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 403. 
 148. 151 F.R.D. 478 (D.D.C. 1993). 
 149. Id. at 481-82. 
 150. Id. at 482-83. 
 151. 2006 WL 263631 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2006). 
 152. Id. at *3.  Notably, Judge Baylson had previous experience with confidential 
informants in private securities litigation: prior to joining the bench, he had succeeded 
in obtaining disclosure of informants’ identities as counsel for the defendant in In re 
Aetna Inc. Securities Litigation, No. CIV. A. MDL 1219, 1999 WL 354527 (E.D. Pa. 
May 26, 1999).  While Judge Baylson recognized the relevant public interest and 
privacy concerns, he did not invoke Rule 26(c) and did not acknowledge the existence 
of the informant’s privilege or cite any of the cases, discussed supra and infra, in which 
courts have protected the identities of persons with relevant knowledge from disclosure.  
Instead, he deemed it “axiomatic that Defendants are entitled to the discovery of the 
name and address of persons with relevant knowledge . . . .”  2006 WL 263631, at *3.  
Accordingly, Cigna did not provide the full measure of protection given by other courts 
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Numerous other courts faced with discovery requests for witness 
identities have performed a similar balancing of public policy and 
privacy interests against defendants’ need for disclosure.  Recognizing 
the chilling effect of disclosure of witnesses’ identities on socially-
valuable speech, courts have protected (i) the identities of doctors who 
reported wrongdoing by a pharmaceutical company sales representative 
to his employer, based on a concern that the representative might “seek 
reprisal against them if he learned their identities;”153 (ii) the identity of 
a referee who evaluated a manuscript for a peer reviewed scholarly 
journal, based on the societal value of the peer review process;154 
(iii) the identities of judges and attorneys who provided adverse 
comments to a screening committee evaluating the performance of an 
attorney retained to provide services to indigent criminal defendants, 
based on the “important societal interest” of an effective evaluation 
process and chilling effect of disclosures;155 (iv) the identity of a person 
who reported suspected child abuse, based on the societal value of such 
disclosures and the chilling effect of revealing the identity of 
reporters;156 (v) the identities of doctors and hospitals who reported 
adverse reactions to drugs under a voluntary reporting system operated 
by the Food and Drug Administration;157 (vi) the identities of doctors 
and patients involved in medical peer reviews arising from incidents of 
possible medical error;158 and (vii) the identities of academic tenure 
committee members and evaluators.159
Courts have also recognized the privacy interests affected by 
disclosure—interests possessed by confidential informants, as 
recognized in Gill160—and protected these individuals’ identities in a 
and advocated in this article. 
 153. Ramirez v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 425 F.3d 67, 74 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 154. Solarex Corp. v. Arco Solar, Inc., 870 F.2d 642, 644 (Fed. Cir. 1989), aff’g 121 
F.R.D. 163 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). 
 155. Mitchell v. Fishbein, 227 F.R.D. 239, 245-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
 156. DeLeon v. Putnam Valley Bd. of Educ., 228 F.R.D. 213, 217-21 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) 
 157. In re Eli Lilly & Co., Prozac Prod. Liab. Litig., 142 F.R.D. 454, 457 (S.D. Ind. 
1992). 
 158. Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284, 288 n.4 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 159. Schneider v. Nw. Univ., 151 F.R.D. 319, 324 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Black v. N.Y.U. 
Med. Ctr., No. 94 CIV. 9074 (SS) (NRB), 1996 WL 294310, at *4 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. June 
3, 1996). 
 160. Gill v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, Inc., 399 F.3d 391, 402-03 (1st Cir. 
2005). 
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range of situations.  Based on privacy concerns, courts have protected 
(i) abortion records identifying patients in a litigation with the 
Department of Justice over the constitutionality of anti-abortion 
legislation;161 (ii) the identity of residents of a group home for juveniles 
in a civil rights action arising out of improper conduct by employees at 
the home;162 and (iii) the names of patients in a nursing home in a suit 
alleging overcharging for medications.163
Citing both public interests and privacy rights, courts have also 
protected the identities of participants in a study sponsored by the Center 
for Disease Control in a products liability action,164 and the names of 
members of a private medical society in an action alleging 
anticompetitive conduct by the society.165
Protection of private confidential informants also finds support in 
cases shielding the investigatory materials of private industry trade 
groups that perform regulatory functions.  In Ross v. Bolton,166 the court 
recognized that the public interest in effective industry regulation by the 
National Association of Securities Dealers warranted protection for its 
investigative files.167  Similar interests have been recognized, and 
similar protections afforded, for investigative files of the New York 
Mercantile Exchange168 and the New York City Board of Trade.169
One obvious precedent for protecting the identities of private 
informants—the reporter’s privilege—in fact provides little guidance 
because the current status of this privilege is unsettled.170
 161. Nw. Mem. Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 926-27 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 162. Seales v. Macomb County., 226 F.R.D. 572, 578-79 (E.D. Mich. 2005). 
 163. Arenson v. Whitehall Convalescent and Nursing Home, Inc., 161 F.R.D. 355, 
358 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
 164. Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1546-47 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 165. Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1159-60 (7th 
Cir. 1984) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 470 U.S. 373 (1985). 
 166. 106 F.R.D. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 167. Id. at 24. 
 168. Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 110 F.R.D. 490, 496-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 169. DGM Inv., Inc. v. NY Futures Exch., Inc., 224 F.R.D. 133, 140-42 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004). 
 170. See Wendy N. Davis, The Squeeze on the Press, 91 A.B.A. J. 22, 22 (2005) 
(describing courts’ recent trend away from protecting journalists).  The D.C. Circuit’s 
recent decision in In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (as reissued Feb. 3, 2006), illustrates the current uncertainty surrounding the 
privilege.  After postulating the existence of a common law privilege protecting 
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E.  Balancing as Applied to Confidential Informants 
To obtain a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c), the moving 
party “has the burden of showing that good cause exists for issuance of 
that order.”171  A plaintiff seeking protection for its confidential 
informants is therefore obligated to establish a threshold need for 
protection.  Where informants have already supplied information, a 
plaintiff should meet its burden by submitting affidavits from the 
informants in camera (with suitably redacted copies provided to 
opposing counsel), stating their reasons for fearing retaliation.  Where a 
protective order is sought in anticipation of obtaining information, the 
plaintiff should be required to submit an affidavit from an investigator 
averring that one or more persons (i) have informed the investigator that 
they have information concerning suspected wrongdoing by the 
defendant, (ii) are unwilling to provide such information due to a fear of 
retaliation, or other injury, if their identity is disclosed, and (iii) would 
be willing to provide such information if assured that their identity 
would be shielded from disclosure. 
As discussed supra,172 Rule 26(c) requires the trial court to 
“undertake ‘an individualized balancing of the many interests that may 
be present in a particular case.’”173  In performing this balancing, 
“[b]road allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or 
articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.”174
 
reporters’ confidential sources, the panel held that such a privilege would not apply on 
the facts there.  Id. at 1150.  In separate concurring opinions, two members of the panel 
then proceeded to address whether such privilege existed—and in carefully reasoned 
opinions reached opposite conclusions.  Compare id. at 1153-59 (holding no such 
privilege exists); with id. at 1163-78 (holding that such privilege does exist). 
 171. Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting In 
re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 145 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 
U.S. 953 (1987)).  Accord Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Tech., Inc., 998 F.2d 
157, 166 (3d Cir. 1993).  See also 6 MOORE, supra note 82, § 26.104[1], at 26-251. 
 172. See supra, Part IV.D. 
 173. Diamond Ventures, LLC v. Barreto, 452 F.3d 892, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(quoting In re Sealed Case (Medical Records), 381 F.3d 1205, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(remanding because the district court failed to perform an appropriate balancing 
analysis)).  Accord Gill v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, 399 F.3d 391, 400 (1st Cir. 
2005); Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1313 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (“Federal courts have superimposed a balancing of interests approach for 
Rule 26’s good cause requirement.”). 
 174. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986).  Accord 
Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 384 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2004).  See also 6 MOORE, supra 
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In the case of confidential informants, the public’s interest in 
disclosure of wrongdoing, together with the witness’ privacy interests, 
must be balanced against the defendant’s need to defend the action.  
When balancing these interests, it is important to recognize that the harm 
to be avoided is the possibility that potential witnesses will refuse to 
come forward—i.e., the chilling effect of the fear of possible retaliation 
or harm to reputation, and not the likelihood of actual retaliation or other 
injury.  Even if a witness’ fear of adverse consequences is unfounded, 
such fear can nonetheless silence the witness and prevent disclosure of 
the wrongdoing.  Accordingly, the absence of credible evidence of a 
threat should not impede issuance of a protective order based on a 
potential witness’ bona fide concerns, as presented to the court by 
affidavit.  Focusing on the chilling effect, rather than the actual risk of 
harm, is consistent with the balancing cases cited supra, none of which 
attempted to evaluate whether the fear of harm was well founded.175  
The “difficulty of such proof”176 further supports this view. 
After the plaintiff has carried the initial burden of demonstrating a 
need for protection, the analysis performed in Roviaro provides well-
developed guidance for balancing this need against both the defendant’s 
interest in effectively opposing the claim and the judicial system’s 
policy in favor of liberal discovery.177  Under Roviaro, as discussed 
supra,178 courts look to the role of the informant, with an informant who 
has played an active role in the wrongdoing far more likely to be 
exposed than one who was a “mere tipster.”179  In civil cases involving 
corporate wrongdoing, courts also directly evaluate the relevancy of the 
information possessed by the informant to the facts at issue in the 
case.180
Applying these principles, the Fifth Circuit refused to disclose the 
identity of an informant in a case brought under the FLSA, Brock v. On 
Shore Quality Control Specialists, Inc.181  The court observed that: 
note 82, § 26.102[1], at 26-246. 
 175. See supra notes 153-59 and 164-65. 
 176. Dole v. Local 1942, Int’l Bd. of Elec. Workers, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 
1989). 
 177. See supra note 88. 
 178. See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text. 
 179. See supra note 122. 
 180. See supra note 126. 
 181. 811 F.2d 282, 284 (5th Cir. 1987). 
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[t]he issue to be tried in this case concerns the nature of the duties 
performed by these individuals, and whether the duties are, as 
claimed, administrative.  The list of “all persons who have given 
information to the Department of Labor” is “utterly irrelevant to the 
issues to be tried by the trial court.”182
Similarly, in Usery v. Ritter,183 the Tenth Circuit refused disclosure in 
another FLSA case, noting that: 
[t]he record contains no showing by defendants of their need, or the 
reasons for their need, of the disclosure of the identity of the 
informants.  The defendants know the job classifications, the pay 
rolls, and the type of work done by each employee.  The government 
has specified individuals, classifications, and types of machines 
which it deems pertinent to its case.184
In many cases, private informants are similarly situated to the 
government informants in Ritter and On Shore Quality Control.  They 
have learned of wrongdoing either because they were personally 
directed to undertake improper actions, or because fellow employees 
informed them of improprieties.  As in the FLSA cases cited, the truth is 
within the knowledge of the defendants, and there is little legitimate 
need to obtain discovery from the informant.  There may be situations 
where an informant played an active role in wrongdoing or had 
conversations with senior managers who are no longer available.  In 
these situations, disclosure of the informant’s identity may well be 
required, but these instances will be the exception. 
Thus, in most cases, a balancing analysis under Rule 26(c) will 
support shielding the identities of confidential informants from 
disclosure. 
F.  Practice Issues in Protecting Informants’ Identities 
While protection of informants has often been litigated in the 
context of a Rule 37(a) motion to compel,185 seeking a protective order 
under Rule 26(c) or moving to quash or modify a subpoena pursuant to 
 
 182. Id. at 284 (citing Wirtz v. Cont’l Fin. & Loan Co., 326 F.2d 561, 563 (5th Cir. 
1964)). 
 183. 547 F.2d 528 (10th Cir. 1977). 
 184. Id. at 531. 
 185. Each of the decisions in the securities cases discussed in Part IV.A supra 
involved motions to compel responses to interrogatories. 
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Rule 45(c)(3)186 provides benefits to plaintiffs beyond the usual postural 
advantages.  First, a Rule 26(c) motion offers the opportunity to bring 
the importance of informants to the court’s attention early in a case and 
provides the occasion to allow witness statements to be tendered for in 
camera review in advance of a ruling on a motion to dismiss.  Second, a 
protective order significantly enhances the ability of plaintiffs’ 
investigators to give comfort to potential informants regarding their risk 
of exposure.  It also sets the “ground rules” for initial disclosures under 
Rule 26(a) and for later discovery proceedings. 
A protective order should provide that the plaintiff may withhold 
the identity of a witness in discovery if the witness requests anonymity, 
provided that the plaintiff discloses the existence of the witness to the 
defendant and reasonably identifies (i) the subject matter of the 
information provided, and (ii) how the source came to possess the 
information provided. 
Because a defendant may choose to depose a non-party who has 
served as a confidential informant, even if the informant has not been 
identified as such by the plaintiff, the order should also bar defendant’s 
counsel from inquiring in depositions as to whether a witness had 
voluntarily initiated contact with the plaintiff, or provided information to 
the plaintiff or its investigators. 
Insuring the flow of information from informants may also require 
an order stating that confidentiality agreements between the defendant 
and former employees do not bar those employees from providing 
information concerning the misconduct at issue, or are void as against 
public policy to the extent they purport to bar communications 
concerning alleged wrongdoing.187  A detailed discussion of when such 
 186. The Rule 45 motion to quash “is similar to a motion for a protective order that 
discovery not be had under Rule 26(c), and is therefore judged under similar standards.”  
9 MOORE, supra note 82, § 45.50[2], at 45-73 to -74. 
 187. See In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127, (N.D. Cal. 
2002).  The court held that the defendant’s confidentiality agreements were: 
so broad that they cover information that cannot possibly be considered confidential.  
To the extent that those agreements preclude former employees from assisting in 
investigations of wrongdoing that have nothing to do with trade secrets or other 
confidential business information, they conflict with the public policy in favor of 
allowing even current employees to assist in securities fraud investigations. 
Id. at 1137.  See also United States v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., 350 F. Supp. 2d 
765, 773 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (False Claims Act’s “strong policy of protecting 
whistleblowers who report fraud against the government” barred counterclaim against 
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orders are appropriate is beyond the scope of this article. 
G.  Protection for Witness Interview Notes 
As discussed supra, the informant’s privilege extends only to the 
identity of the informant, and shields documents only to the extent they 
tend to reveal the identity of an informant.188  Given the similarity of the 
policies underlying the balancing analysis discussed supra, the 
protection afforded under this analysis should not extend further. 
While interests in confidentiality cannot justify withholding 
suitably redacted witness interview notes, such notes are entitled to 
protection as attorney work product, whether recorded by an attorney189 
or an investigator.190  Rule 26(b)(3), which codifies the work product 
doctrine, ordinarily allows disclosure “upon a showing that the party 
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation 
of the party’s case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to 
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.”  
While withholding the identity of an informant effectively prevents the 
defendant from obtaining the “substantial equivalent” of the statement 
by way of deposition,191 notes of witness interviews are “opinion work 
product” entitled to heightened protection.  In Upjohn Co. v. United 
States,192 the Supreme Court held that “[f]orcing an attorney to disclose 
notes and memoranda of witnesses’ oral statements is particularly 
disfavored because it tends to reveal the attorney’s mental processes.”193  
Accordingly, “[n]otes and memoranda of an attorney, or an attorney’s 
agent, from a witness interview are opinion work product entitled to 
 
employee for breach of confidentiality agreement). 
 188. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 189. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
 190. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1975) (“[A]ttorneys often must 
rely on the assistance of investigators and other agents in the compilation of materials in 
preparation for trial.  It is therefore necessary that the [work-product] doctrine protect 
material prepared by agents for the attorney as well as those prepared by the attorney 
himself.”). 
 191. See generally 8 WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 124, § 2026, at 375.  
As a general rule, “discovery of work product will be denied if a party can obtain the 
information he seeks by deposition.”  In re Int’l Sys. and Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 
F.2d 1235, 1240 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 192. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
 193. Id. at 399-400. 
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almost absolute immunity.”194
CONCLUSION 
 Sound public policy warrants protecting the identities of non-
testifying confidential informants from disclosure absent a showing of 
genuine need by the defendant.  This principle should be regularly 
applied in securities and other private attorney general litigation.
 194. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 209 F.3d 1051, 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).  See also In 
re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 663 (3d Cir. 2003) (core or opinion work 
product “receives greater protection than ordinary work product and is discoverable 
only upon a showing of rare and exceptional circumstances”). 
 
